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Abstract 
Drawing on unpublished and published sources from 1926 to 1932, this chapter analyzes 
“Three Independent Factors in Morals” (1930) as a blueprint to Dewey’s chapters in the 1932 
Ethics. The 1930 presentation is Dewey’s most concise and sophisticated critique of the quest 
in ethical theory for the central and basic source of normative justification. He argued that 
moral situations are heterogeneous in their origins and operations. They elude full 
predictability and are not controllable by the impositions of any abstract monistic principle. 
Moral life instead has at least three distinct experiential roots that cannot be encompassed in 
one ideal way to proceed. More specifically, Dewey hypothesized that each of the primary 
Western ethical systems (represented for him by Aristotle, Kant, and the British moralists) 
represents a basic, non-arbitrary force, or factor of moral life: aspiration, obligation, and 
approbation, respectively. Each factor is expressed in that system’s leading fundamental 
concept: good, duty, and virtue, respectively. Yet he contended that aspirations, obligations, 
and approbations are distinctive phenomena that cannot be blanketed by a single covering 
concept. By exposing Dewey’s own generalizations to scrutiny, the promises and limitations 
of his approach can be critically evaluated. 
Three Independent Factors in Morals 
On November 7, 1930, Dewey addressed the French Philosophical Society in Paris, giving what his 
French colleagues recognized as “a première of his new ideas” (quoted in LW 5, 503). He hypothesized 
that each of the primary Western ethical systems (represented for him by ancient Greek teleologists, 
Roman and German deontologists, and British moralists) represents an irreducible experiential factor or 
root of moral life: aspiration, obligation, and approbation. Each basic experiential factor is expressed in 
that system’s leading fundamental concept: good, duty, and virtue. Each system seeks to bring divergent 
experiential forces wholly within the logical scope of its own monistic category while treating other 
factors as derivative. For example, rationalistic deontologists conceive a character trait to be virtuous 
because it maps to what is antecedently determined by reason to be right. Dewey, however, contended 
that aspirations, obligations, and approbations are distinctive experiential/existential phenomena that often 
conflict with each other and cannot be fully blanketed by a single covering concept.  
Sorbonne professor Charles Cestre immediately translated Dewey’s 1930 English presentation, 
along with highlights from the ensuing discussion, and published it in Bulletin de la SFP as “Trois 
facteurs indépendants en matière de morale.”1 Decades later, in 1966, Jo Ann Boydston translated the 
French article back into English for Educational Theory as “Three Independent Factors in Morals,” which 
she eventually included in the critical edition of Dewey’s works (LW 5, 279–288). 
Soon after Boydston published her back translation, an unpublished and undated typescript 
(mss102_53_3) was discovered in the Dewey archives at Southern Illinois University, titled in Dewey’s 
hand “Conflict and Independent Variables in Morals.”2 A copy of this typescript was available to 
Abraham Edel and Elizabeth Flowers, who introduced the 1985 critical edition of Dewey’s 1932 Ethics 
(LW 7; cf. Edel 2001). Pages 1–5 and 13 of the typescript remain unpublished, though these pages clarify 
several substantive points about Dewey’s ethical outlook and offer unique angles and metaphors. The first 
five pages were likely presented in 1926 to Columbia University’s philosophy club (Dewey to Horace S. 
Fries [1933.12.26 (07682)]). Pages 6–12 closely track “Trois facteurs indépendants en matière de 
morale,” though Boydston decided not to include Dewey’s substantive handwritten revisions for those 
pages in the critical edition. 
Assuming that Dewey was reworking the typescript for an English publication, why did he never 
follow through? A plausible reply can be inferred from the fact that Dewey incorporated its basic insights 
into his chapters of the 1932 Dewey-Tufts Ethics textbook (LW 7, chs. 10–17). The “three roots” 
hypothesis in the 1930 presentation serves as an organizational chart for those chapters, especially 
Chapters 11–13. But he incorporated the three roots in a less theoretical form that he judged to be better 
suited to the practical and pedagogical needs of undergraduate students (Dewey to Horace S. Fries 
[1933.12.26 (07682)]. He set aside the theoretic key once it had served his pedagogical goal for the 
Ethics, which was to reforge historical theoretical tools in light of contemporary moral needs so that 
students can use them to become more comprehensively conscientious in their deliberations and character 
development. Specifically, Dewey’s goal in the 1932 Ethics was to help students become more perceptive 
of moral complexity, study and assess their own circumstances in light of prior systems, and competently 
use diverse theories as deliberative tools (reforged to see connections that had escaped our notice) in 
predicaments that require practical coordination among disparate elements.3 
The theoretic key he left behind is among the most practically significant things Dewey ever 
wrote on ethics, and its significance has arguably increased as rampant moral fundamentalism and 
homogeneous narrowness continue to build walls of exclusionary oppression (see Collins 1998) and block 
the way to discovering shared toeholds to debate and achieve social goals like public health, justice, 
security, and sustainability. Moral fundamentalism encourages antagonism toward excluded standpoints, 
closure to being surprised by the complexity of many problems, neglect of the context in which decisions 
are made, obtuseness about one’s own truncated framework, and a related general indifference to public 
processes and adaptive policies. It may be progressive in one dimension of a problem, but typically at the 
cost of being regressive with respect to concerns that are off the radar of our idealizations. These concerns 
are habitually overlooked or relegated as externalities. 
Meanwhile, reactionary nihilism is merely moral fundamentalism’s mirror image, setting up a 
false dilemma between nihilism and fundamentalism. Dewey rejected both of the principal alternatives on 
offer: moral monism (the quest for a single ethical ruler to govern deliberation) and moral skepticism 
(which takes the absence of such a ruler to spell the end of ethics). Instead of joining monists in an 
outdated quest for a theoretical hierarchy that subdues variety among fundamental moral concepts, or 
merely venturing “an eclectic combination of the different theories” (LW 7, 180), Dewey approached 
philosophical research into ethics as a way to help create a shared cultural context in which we cultivate 
conditions for communicative inquiry that refreshingly steers clear of any tendency to autocratically 
predefine what is relevant and to prejudge alternative formulations without dialogue. 
In a letter to Horace S. Fries [1933.12.26 (07682)], Dewey identified the key conceptual shift he 
made between the 1908 Ethics (MW 5) and the 1932 revision. He had, he wrote, been committed in 1908 
to a “socialized utilitarianism” that foreshortened moral action from the teleological perspective of the 
good. This monistic consequentialism is also apparent in Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics (1891, 
EW 2, 238–388) and The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus (1894, EW 4, 219–362). Note, importantly, that 
Dewey nowhere reduced moral life to a triumvirate of root factors; he did not have a universal, cover-all 
ethical theory. But by 1932 he had transitioned to a strong axiological pluralism that maintained the 
intellectual distinctness of variables in moral action, variables that are selectively—often helpfully—
emphasized in key abstract ethical concepts. 
Dewey’s typology of “at least three” relatively independent factors in moral action developed in 
the 1920s as the organizing principle of his spring 1926 course in “Ethical Theory” at Columbia 
University. Thanks to Donald Koch’s editorial work on The Class Lectures of John Dewey (2010), 
researchers have access to material unknown to Edel or Flowers, including Sidney Hook’s class lecture 
notes on that 1926 course. Hook’s notes take readers into the classroom as Dewey surveys the history of 
ethical theory to lay bare “certain categories found to be involved in judgments which men actually pass 
in the course of moral conduct and which concepts have become the foundation stones of theories about 
ethics” (in Koch 2010, 2.2230). The 1926 course—akin in its topic to a course in meta-ethics today in that 
it was “not concerned with what is specifically right, but with the category of right” (2.2230)—was 
organized around a hypothetical explanation for the variety of ethical theories. 
In the 1926 course, Dewey struggled with whether right and duty are fundamentally different 
concepts. For example, he explored Sidgwick’s notion in The Methods of Ethics that the right is the 
“Rational Good,” which Sidgwick contrasted with a merely natural good (cf. Lazari-Radek and Singer 
2014). Dewey said in the class’s opening days: 
These remarks [identifying good, right, duty, and virtue as fundamental concepts that enter 
into moral conduct] presuppose the possibility of a hierarchy of these different ideas, i.e., all 
deduced from a supreme one. But an alternative is possible, i.e., that none are derivative or 
subordinate. They may be independent variables, i.e., ideas representing facts which while 
they overlap, are still intellectually distinct so far as the meaning of the four terms is 
concerned. The originality in the [Spring 1926] course will largely be concerned with the 
inability to find a single central notion from which the others can be derived or around which 
they can be organized. Two or three may be connected, but there are at least three independent 
variables. 
(in Koch 2010, 2.2231) 
Urging that moral uncertainties arise from conflicts inhering in situations, and that moral 
problems do not come prepackaged with a correct formulation or a single justified course of action, 
Dewey in 1926–1932 broadened his scope beyond his prior focus on moral psychology in Human Nature 
and Conduct (1922)—e.g., his theory of dramatic rehearsal in deliberation (see Fesmire 2003, ch. 5)—to 
encompass the wider scene of moral action. “Three Independent Factors in Morals” is Dewey’s resulting 
conceptual map of the existential terrain of moral action. The essay foreshortens his mature ethical theory. 
In what follows, I draw on the aforementioned unpublished and published sources from 1926 to 1932 to 
clarify Dewey’s analysis in “Three Independent Factors in Morals” of good, duty, and virtue as distinct 
concepts that in many cases express different experiential origins. 
Is There a Conceptual Home Range of Moral Action? 
Is there a single empirical source of moral action, or are there plural sources? This was Dewey’s central 
question as an ethical theorist from 1926 to 1932—again, aside from any normative prescriptions or 
constraints regarding what specifically is good or bad, right or wrong, virtuous or vicious. His hypothesis 
was that moral problems require us to reconcile and coordinate “heterogeneous elements” (in Koch 2010, 
2.2270) that include “at least three independent variables in moral action” (LW 5, 280) which “pull 
different ways” (Dewey, undated ms, 4). These variables are independent in the sense that one is neither 
logically derivable from another nor translatable without remainder into the terms of another. If Dewey is 
right that there are several empirical roots of moral action, then one radical implication is that any ethical 
theory that strives like logical or mathematical theories to solve any moral problem with the single “right” 
method or procedure will be inadequate to the heterogeneity of moral experience. 
In the 1930 presentation, Dewey began his analysis with a simplified binary of independent 
factors in morals before expanding to “at least” a trifecta. He operationalized the two most familiar 
“opposing systems of moral theory” by rejecting the false dilemma that binds them: either what’s morally 
Right derives from what’s Good (so we get a teleological morality of ends, where right action is defined 
as the means to the supreme good of eudaimonia, pleasure, self-realization, liberty, equality, 
sustainability, or the like), or what’s morally Good derives from what’s Right (so we get a deontological 
morality of laws, where right action is prescribed by “juridical imperative”). Dewey argued that “neither 
of the two can derive from the other,” there is no “constant principle” tilting the balance “on the side of 
good or of law,” and that both good and law are conceptions that “flow from independent springs” (LW 5, 
281). Consequently, in moral education, learning to desire the good and learning to do one’s duty are 
equally legitimate expectations, yet each frequently gets in each other’s way and tugs in different 
directions. Reflective morality consists, then, in the capacity to determine a “practical middle footing” 
between practically incommensurable claims, “a middle footing which leans as much to one side as to the 
other without following any rule which may be posed in advance” (281). 
Moral situations, in Dewey’s view, are not just occasions for uncertainty about what to do; 
problematic moral situations more typically justify our uncertainty. “Moral experience is a genuine 
experience” of real, systemic conflicts (in Koch 2010, 2.2270), so we generally ought to be reflective. 
And yet, Dewey argued, traditional theories have treated conflict as specious rather than as part and parcel 
of moral experience. Moral philosophers have not failed to acknowledge angst, but they have for the most 
part postulated “one single principle as an explanation of moral life” (LW 5, 280), a correct standpoint 
from which we will at least in principle see that our initial hesitancy had been based on momentary 
ignorance. 
If there is a unitary conceptual home range of moral action, moral conflict boils down to 
hesitancy on our part about what to choose. On that view, what is good or virtuous or right is already licit, 
ready to be laid bare by intellectual analysis. But in fact morally uncertain situations require us to 
reconcile conflicting factors with multiple conceptual ranges. Consequently, Dewey urged: “It is not 
without significance that uncertainty is felt most keenly by those who are called conscientious” (Dewey, 
undated ms, 13). Should an expectant mother of triplets selectively reduce to twins? Should we globally 
follow a principle of per capita equity for carbon emissions? Should John have had the affair with Anzia? 
To see these questions through the lens of only one factor—as at bottom a matter of rights not 
downstream consequences, of what is right not what is good, of duty not virtue, of what I should do and 
not what kind of person I should become—risks lop-sided, partial, and exclusionary deliberation that 
pretends as a matter of course to have precisely captured all that is morally or politically relevant to the 
choice. In actual experience, it would be an atypically easy case in which tensions among values could be 
resolved by appealing to a supreme value, principle, standard, law, concept, or ideal that exhausts 
whatever is of moral worth in the rest of our concerns. 
Under the narrow monistic assumption legitimized by traditional ethical theorizing, conflict and 
diversity are merely apparent (LW 5, 279–288). A situation may at first seem to be a quagmire, the 
supposition runs, but rigorous examination, or more data to feed into our utility calculations, or 
comparison to an egalitarian island of rational albeit hapless contractors (see Dworkin 2000), will reveal 
that (a) there had been a good, right, or fair path through it all along, and (b) the path’s goodness, 
rightness, or fairness overrides other considerations when it comes to justifying the choice. 
In Dewey’s idiom, uncertainty on this monistic view is seen mostly as a “hesitation about choice” 
between the moral and the immoral: we assume we must choose the good (vs. evil), will the obligatory 
(vs. giving way to appetite, inclination, and desire), or do the virtuous (vs. the vicious). “That is the 
necessary logical conclusion if moral action has only one source, if it ranges only within a single 
category” (LW 5, 280). “We may be in doubt as to what the good or the right or the virtuous is in a 
complicated situation,” but under the traditional one-way assumption “it is there and determination of it is 
at most a purely intellectual question, not a moral one. There is no conflict inhering in the situation” 
(Dewey, undated ms, 3). 
Yet contemporary moral and political conflicts are rarely so superficial that a theoretically correct 
rational analysis could, even in principle, sweep the path clear toward what is “truly” good, right, just, or 
virtuous. Entanglements of often-incompatible forces inhere in typical moral predicaments (cf. Latour 
1993). It is typical to find ourselves tugged in multiple ways, none of which has overriding moral force. 
This relative incommensurability of forces presents, for Dewey, a practical problem that requires moral 
imagination and artistry (cf. Alexander 2013). For example, anyone who has worked on administrative 
policies for allocating faculty workloads at a university is at least implicitly aware that an institution or 
department can purchase greater aggregate happiness at the price of some unfairness. One can also 
demand an exactingly rational fairness in workload at the cost of some unhappiness. Is the job of the 
theorist to discern which of these ways of organizing reflection is the most justified? That is, is the 
theorist’s job to show a priori which antecedently defended and relatively static principles should govern 
choice? A Deweyan alternative is not to override one of these conceptual frameworks on behalf of a 
purportedly more rational monistic framework, but to democratically elicit the generative possibilities of a 
situation that may be shackled by an overly legalistic approach that is insensitive to intractable tensions. 
In the Q&A that followed the 1930 presentation, Dewey admitted that 
he exaggerated, for purposes of discussion, the differences among the three factors, that indeed 
moral theories do touch on these three factors more or less, but what he wanted to emphasize 
was the fact that each particular moral theory takes one of them as central and that is what 
becomes the important point, while the other factors are only secondary. 
(LW 5, 503) 
The central dogma of ethical theory is that any adequate account of metaethics and normative 
morality must be given in terms of one supreme root (Fesmire 2003, 2015). Yet proponents of each 
primary ethical system miss, at least in their explicit theorizing, the tensions that constantly underlie 
moral action as irreducible forces, as when binding social demands conflict with aspirations. Dewey 
insisted that it is not possible to theoretically settle moral problems in advance of their occurrence because 
each variable in moral action “has a different origin and mode of operation,” so “they can be at cross 
purposes and exercise divergent forces in the formation of judgment.” “The essence of the moral situation 
is an internal and intrinsic conflict; the necessity for judgment and for choice comes from the fact that one 
has to manage forces with no common denominator” (LW 5, 280). Dewey’s alternative for future ethical 
and political theorizing would be to lay bare and classify these practical entanglements within a wider 
“framework of moral conceptions” that puts basic roots in communication (LW 7, 309), so that we might 
“attend more fully to the concrete elements entering into the situations” in which we must act (LW 5, 
288). 
From Three Factors to Three Foundations 
To recap Dewey’s hypothesis, problematic moral situations are heterogeneous in their origins and 
operations. They tangle and diverge in ways that elude full predictability and are typically not controllable 
by the impositions of any abstract monistic principle. Moral life has at least three distinct experiential 
roots that cannot be encompassed in one ideal way to think about morals. Hence, most importantly for 
reconstructing traditional ethical theories, there is no universal foundation of ethics—whether 
procedurally constructed or “foundational” in the now old-fashioned sense—that would allow us to single 
out, in Thompson’s phrasing, “the most fully justified course of action, even in situations where 
beneficial outcomes are offset by costs, or where rights and duties conflict” (Thompson 2016, 70). 
Dewey’s unpublished typescript clarifies the hypothesis: 
The three things I regard as variables are first the facts that give rise to the concept of the good 
and bad; secondly, those that give rise to the concept of right and wrong; thirdly, those that 
give rise to the conception of the virtuous and vicious. …What I am concerned to point out 
[is] that the concrete conflict is not just among these concepts, but in the elements of the actual 
moral situation that, when they are abstracted and generalized, give rise to these conceptions.4 
(Dewey, undated ms, 2) 
In this section, I clarify Dewey’s hypothesis by interspersing the three experiential factors and 
concomitant abstract concepts, as emphasized in the 1930 presentation, with the parallel chapters in the 
1932 Ethics (Chapters 11–13). 
Ends, the Good, and Wisdom 
The Good as a leading concept in reflective ethics springs from desires and aspirations. People have 
purposes they aim to realize; pervasive wants, drives, appetites, and needs that demand to be satisfied. Yet 
what seems good at short range may not in fact be durably good. If only miracles would intervene to keep 
our choices from having their usual side effects!  But in the universe we are obliged to inhabit, the 
satisfaction we crave may not be judged satisfactory when we take a wider view. So we need practice and 
wisdom to thoughtfully discriminate between the real good and the mirage. Consequently, the teleological 
conception of goods that approvably speak to human cravings and aspirations is “neither arbitrary nor 
artificial” (LW 7, 309). When we make hasty choices without intelligent foresight, we just follow the 
strongest impulse and fulfill an inclination without taking its measure. “But when one foresees the 
consequences which may result from the fulfillment of desire, the situation changes” (LW 5, 282). 
Intelligent foresight involves judgment and comparison as we envision consequences ex ante and track 
them ex post. 
Dewey analyzes the imaginative capacity to crystallize possibilities and transform them into 
directive hypotheses in his theory of “dramatic rehearsal” in deliberation (e.g., MW 14, ch. 16; cf. 
Fesmire 2003, Alexander 2013, and Johnson 2019). We imaginatively rehearse alternative avenues for 
acting in a dynamic social context, and judgments can be “examined, corrected, made more exact by 
judgments carried over from other situations; the results of previous estimates and actions are available as 
working materials” (LW 5, 282). In this way, we learn to organize and prioritize desires with an eye to 
their bearings, and this led historically to candidates for the “chief good,” the summum bonum (Aristotle 
1999, Book I) such as hedonistic pleasure, success, wisdom, egoistic satisfaction, asceticism, and self-
realization.5 Wherever this factor is the dominant emphasis in philosophical theorizing, reason is 
conceived as “intelligent insight into complete and remote consequences of desire” (LW 7, 217). The 
envisioned action is right and virtuous because it is truly, far-sightedly good; it is wrong and vicious 
because it is short-sightedly bad. 
As a contemporary example, take Singer’s hedonistic utilitarian approach to “effective altruism.” 
For Singer, reason objectively calculates the best quantifiable way to “maximize the amount of good you 
do over your lifetime” (Singer 2015, 65). Reason counters our emotive tendency to discount the lives of 
those who are physically or temporally distant.  Singer argues that reason also checks our tendency to 
mistake “warm glow giving,” as with the Make-a-Wish Foundation, with cost-effective philanthropies 
like GiveWell. One need not be morally “on the clock” 24/7, as this would reach a point of diminishing 
returns (what Singer calls the point of marginal utility).  But weighing your options—say, alternatives for 
charitable giving—to objectively determine the most good that you can do, is what it means to be moral. 
If you can work for Goldman Sachs and donate your considerable discretionary cash to effective charities, 
you may do more life-saving and quality-of-life-improving good than if you strictly adhere to a 
deontological “do no harm” principle and refuse to participate in the capitalistic financial system due to 
its putative unfairness. The good that you do justifies your participation in the system, unless you could 
have aggregated more good in some other way. If struggling against structural inequalities by minimizing 
involvement in financial markets adds up to the most good you can do, then it is justified.  But for Singer, 
fighting for justice is not good “in itself” independent of its utility.  
For Singer, answering a moral problem is analogous to answering a math problem. It requires us 
to calculate payoffs and pitfalls and thereby determine the objective good (145). For instance, what 
priority should we give to expenditures on decreasing existential risk (from asteroids, climate change, 
etc.)? Singer quotes Bostrom, an Oxford utilitarian specializing in existential risk, who calculates that it 
should be our highest global priority: “If benefiting humanity by increasing existential safety achieves 
expected good on a scale many orders of magnitude greater than that of alternative contributions, we 
would do well to focus on this most efficient philanthropy” (174). 
In the unpublished typescript, Dewey included such mathematizing, neo-Benthamite approaches 
in a sweeping criticism of traditional moral philosophies:  appeals to “the dictates of conscience,” 
intuition, a moral calculus, moral law, or divine command acknowledge moral hesitancy and puzzlement, 
but they mask existential uncertainty when they presuppose “that the answer to a moral problem is 
already licit, like the answer to a problem in a text on arithmetic that it only remains to figure correctly.” 
Dewey held that moral problems typically bear little analogy to elementary arithmetic tasks, or to being 
stumped by a hard puzzle. When calculating the square root of 25, there is a clear-cut way to formulate 
the problem and a right solution, so the only real problem is momentary ignorance of the answer. In moral 
life, however, the answers are not already licit.  
In the undated manuscript Dewey wrote, “Genuine uncertainty is an essential trait of every moral 
situation” (Dewey, undated ms, 1). He is not merely remarking here on the uncertainty that arises from 
the difficulty of a puzzle, or to lack of access to relevant data to plug into our diagnostic machinery. 
Dewey contended that a typical moral choice among viable alternatives cannot even in principle be 
definitively formulated and finally answered by assembling information and then calculating profits and 
losses on a moral accounting spreadsheet. Utilitarianism’s economic-mathematical balancing model can 
function well as a heuristic for some purposes. Dewey does not deny this. But he did challenge the 
aggregationist’s obsession with predetermined metrics whereby we judiciously weigh matters so that the 
balance tips toward the good or “optimal” outcome supported by some welfarist principle.  Insofar as 
such metrics economize deliberation without occluding morally relevant factors, then they are 
pragmatically valuable to that extent, but insofar as any approach fails to prioritize sensitivity to context, 
creative social inquiry, and experimental understanding of complex underlying structures, their actual 
results are too often reminiscent of an offhanded criticism that Dewey once made about “popcorn” 
solutions: put the right amount in the right mechanism and you get some “unnutritious readymade stuff” 
that will not sustain anyone for long (1951.02.14 [14090]: Dewey to Max C. Otto). 
Right, Duty, and Loyalty 
The way we express our concerns and make sense of problems is acquired through interaction with a 
sociocultural medium. Dewey argued that the intimacy of the Greek polis supported teleological 
intelligence and the idea that laws reflect our rational ability to patiently set and achieve goals together. 
Accordingly, theories of the good made sense to classic Greek theorists. However, the far-flung 
hodgepodge of peoples in the Roman Empire favored the historical development of centralized order and 
the imposition of demands. Consequently, in the transition from Greek teleology to Roman law, as 
exemplified by Stoic philosophers, compliance with authorized duty was placed at “the centre of moral 
theory” (LW 5, 284). 
The resulting deontological or jural theories speak to a fact in everyday human behavior: we 
inescapably make claims on each other through living together. This includes the control of desire and 
appetite, companionship and competition, cooperation and subordination. Our desires are impeded and 
regulated, sorted into the forbidden and the permitted. These demands appear arbitrary unless they square 
with each other’s purposes. So, Dewey proposed, “there finally develops a certain set or system of 
demands, more or less reciprocal according to social conditions, which are … responded to without overt 
revolt.” In this way, authorized rights and duties evolve through demands and prohibitions on others’ 
behavior. “From the standpoint of those whose claims are recognized, these demands are rights; from the 
standpoint of those undergoing them they are duties.” This “constitutes the principle of authority, Jus, 
Recht, Droit, which is current” (284). 
Dewey hypothesizes, then, that duty as a leading concept in morals arisesfrom authoritative 
control of individual satisfactions and temptations. As such, the concept of duty (along with the related 
concept of loyalty to what is right) is  independent of the concept of good.  The concepts of duty and good 
are independent both in their existential origins and in their logical operations. These concepts pivot on 
different elements: the good pivots on aspiration; the right pivots on exaction. 
As Kant recognized, because imperatives often inhibit the fulfillment of desires, the concept of 
duty is not “reducible to the conception of the good as satisfaction, even reasonable satisfaction, of 
desire” (LW 7, 214). Kant additionally recognized that there is no moral quality in binding our choices to 
an authority we deem ultimately arbitrary. Several years ago, my young son was happily picking flowers 
in a public garden, and we told him “don’t pick the flowers.” To him, our curtailment of this good seemed 
to be an arbitrary imposition. Asked about this a few years later, he said it was reasonable for his liberty 
to be restrained in this way. What had begun as compliance had been converted into something with 
moral standing, something right. He now acknowledged it as a moral demand that he should meet. 
Taking these insights a step further, Dewey distinguished the origins of root factors from their 
eventual operations. For example, that which operates as a good that one sincerely aspires to may have 
originated as a duty with which one had to comply. Today my son wants to help that garden flourish. 
What began as an alien injunction that thwarted his desires developed into something right to which he 
personally realized the wisdom of submitting, and then it became a good that he pursued absent any 
requirement. The same might eventually be said of his enforced duty to do school work, which can also 
originate in obedience to communal regulations. When cultivating a garden or going to school enter one’s 
personal aspirations “it loses its quality of being right and authoritative and becomes simply a good” (LW 
5, 285).6  
To summarize, “the Good is that which attracts; the Right is that which asserts that we ought to 
be drawn by some object whether we are naturally attracted to it or not” (LW 7, 217). When the latter 
factor is foremost, reason (or alternatively a presumed innate faculty of conscience) is conceived as “a 
power which is opposed to desire and which imposes restrictions on its exercise through issuing 
commands” (217). An act is good and virtuous because it is right; it is bad and vicious because it is 
wrong. To the degree that a deontologist is a monist, it follows there are no morally relevant aspects of 
virtue or good that cannot be blanketed under the concepts of duty, right, law, and obligation. To will and 
be loyal to what is right purely because it is right, and not because it is prudent, is consequently a 
common way of framing moral judgments, and the conception of lawful duty and compliance with 
constraints of the right is thus taken by many to be the universal foundation of ethics.7 
Dewey applied these insights to Kantian deontology in the 1932 Ethics. According to Kantians, 
what is morally Good “is that which is Right, that which accords with law and the commands of duty” 
(214–216). Contemporary representatives include Rawls (1971), Donagan (1977), Gewirth (1978), 
Darwall (1983), and Korsgaard (1996). For example, central to his conception of justice as fairness, 
Rawls distinctively holds with Kant that a principle of right must take priority over consequentialist 
concepts of good (1971, 31; cf. Freeman 2007, 72). Rawls references The Critique of Practical Reason: 
“the concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law…, but only after it and by 
means of it” (Kant 2002, 37). One should struggle against inequality or strive to change an unjust system 
independent of any welfarist purpose such as anticipated net utility. For Kantians, the good is a path to the 
right, and the right gets its legitimate governing authority by reasonably obliging.  In Korsgaard’s idiom 
on the “source of normativity,” on the Kantian view moral obligations are assigned by autonomous 
consciousness (1996; cf. Schaubroeck 2010). Complying with your duty and thereby at least attitudinally 
intending to uphold the rights of others is what it means to be moral. 
Rawls or Korsgaard would reasonably wonder how social expectations take on justifiable moral 
authority on Dewey’s naturalistic and pragmatic view. In other words, how does Dewey reinterpret the 
locus and ground of rightfulness without falling back on any of the traditional sources of normativity: 
God, the state, an inner law of pure practical reason, autonomous consciousness, a law of nature, or 
idealized rational actors? Dewey’s general reply was that relationships naturally bind us to each other—as 
parents and children, spouses or partners, friends, and citizens. These relationships expose us to “the 
expectations of others and to the demands in which these expectations are made manifest.” This is equally 
true of social expectations within institutions and political alliances. Explicit and implicit claims upon us 
are “as natural as anything else in a world in which persons are not isolated from one another but live in 
constant association and interaction” (LW 7, 218). Although a child, friend, spouse, or citizen might be 
coerced into conformity, they experience this as a brute imposition of power without moral standing. 
Social expectations become moral claims because, even when inconvenient or exasperating, 
conscientious parents, friends, spouses, or citizens respond to relations of parenting, friendship, marriage, 
and citizenship as “expressions of the whole” to which they belong rather than as extrinsic impositions 
(218). 
If we generalize such instances, we reach the conclusion that right, law, duty, arise from the 
relations which human beings intimately sustain to one another, and that their authoritative 
force springs from the very nature of the relation that binds people together. 
(219) 
In moral life we must meet the demands of the situation, and this requires us to perceive and 
comprehensively respond to more than our own private hankerings. The word duty is apt for the many 
occasions in which our own preferences run at cross-purposes from relational demands that should not be 
shirked merely because they may be irksome, inconvenient, or dangerous. In Dewey’s pragmatic-
operational reconstruction of duty and the right, not only are Kantians right that we cannot rationally will 
a world of liars or thieves; they are also right to call for an inner sentinel alert to the exceptions we make 
of ourselves even as we make demands on others. Who is better than Rawls, for example, for shining a 
light on the way we benefit from a practice while shirking to do our share in sustaining that practice for 
others? (cf. Appiah 2017, 203). Though for Dewey, the general social demand to do our fair share is 
justified in practice, not by compliance with the first principles of idealized contractors. 
Kantians typically reject Dewey’s style of aspectual pragmatizing and operationalizing as an 
abdication of morality. Nevertheless, Dewey agreed with Kant that “to be truthful from duty is …quite 
different from being truthful from fear of disadvantageous consequences” (Kant 1993, 15). Duty, right, 
and obligation are concepts that serve an experiential function as one among several constant and 
distinctive streams of morals. Kant’s mistake was to hypostatize this factor and sharply separate moral 
conduct from our natural aspirations and practical purposes, inferring that “All so-called moral interest 
consists solely in respect for the law” (14n14). 
Approbation, the Standard, and Virtue 
A third independent primitive factor in morals is centered on praise and blame, approval and disapproval, 
reward and punishment (LW 5, 285). “Acts and dispositions generally approved form the original virtues; 
those condemned the original vices” (286). This factor differs fundamentally, at least in principle, from 
both the deliberative pursuit of ends and the demand for compliance. 
Deontologists use praise and blame as sanctions for right and wrong, while teleological thinkers 
acknowledge the instrumental importance of social approval and disapproval (Dewey, undated ms., 10). 
But as categories, as principles, the virtuous differs radically from the good and the right. 
Goods, I repeat, have to do with deliberation upon desires and purposes; the right and 
obligatory with demands that are socially authorized and backed; virtues with widespread 
approbation. 
(LW 5, 286) 
Virtue ethicists search for consistency and coherence about which character traits ought to be approved or 
censured.  This requires a non-arbitrary standard of approbation to critique the “original,” socially 
preestablished virtues so that more appropriate and defensible ones can be discovered. Typically virtue 
theorists turn, like Anscombe (1958), to some eudaemonistic conception of living well. 
In his 1933 letter to Fries, Dewey credited his mature meta-ethical typology—which complicates 
any simple categorization of Aristotle (1999) as a virtue ethicist, or Mill as an aggregator of good 
consequences—to his careful re-reading of 18th- and 19th-century British moral philosophers such as 
Hume, Smith, Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick. Hook’s 1926 course notes (in Koch 2010) allow us to 
witness this re-reading as it unfolds. Dewey settled on a Jeckyll-and-Hyde reframing of utilitarianism: it’s 
far better to be an inconsistent Millian than a consistent Benthamite. Whereas the Benthamite strain 
persists in its “untenable hedonism,” at the cost of some consistency Mill received and renewed the torch 
of moral sentiment theory by shifting the primary focus of ethics away from what we should do in pursuit 
of pleasures and toward cultivation of character. “Although Mill never quite acknowledges it in words, a 
surrender of the hedonistic element in utilitarianism” enabled him to develop, or mostly develop, a 
welfarist standard implicit in our approbations that favors “worthy dispositions from which issue noble 
enjoyments” (LW 7, 245). 
Commentaries on Dewey’s ethics, including some of my own, have tended to treat utilitarianism 
under the category of the good. But this is a half-truth, as Dewey revealed in his close readings of Smith 
and other 18th century sources of the utilitarian tradition. For British moral sentiment theorists like Hume 
and Smith, morality is founded on sympathetic sentiments. Hume wrote in the Treatise, “Sympathy is the 
chief source of moral distinctions” (1978, 618).8 Sympathy always brings approval, while antipathy 
always brings disapproval. We approve because we sympathize, and whatever elicits our sympathy we 
call good; we disapprove because we feel antipathy, and whatever calls out this sentiment we call bad. 
Nevertheless, in their theories of moral judgment Hume and Smith do not merely equate being praised 
with being praiseworthy. Dewey was especially interested in the way in which, for Hume and Smith, our 
moral sentiments can be corrected and regulated by rational considerations. Dewey observed of moral 
sentiment theory: “In individuals, the exercise of sympathy in accordance with reason—i.e., from the 
standpoint of an impartial spectator, in Smith’s conception—is the norm of virtuous action” (LW 11, 11). 
The job of reason in moral judgment, for Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, is to inform and 
secure the correctives of an impartial standard of approbation so that it plays a formative role in critically 
reflective ends. Reason seeks “a standard upon the basis of which approbation and disapprobation, 
esteem and disesteem, should be awarded” (LW 7, 255).9 
Dewey spotlighted Smith’s approach to this problem of non-arbitrary standards that do not 
merely bow to customary esteem and ridicule. Dewey argues that this problem is uppermost in moral 
sentiment theory “even when the writer seems to be discussing some other question” (LW 5, 286). Again, 
within sentiment theory what is good or dutiful is derived from what our sentiments approve as virtuous 
and disapprove as vicious. And according to Hume and Smith, what we spontaneously sympathize with 
and favor are benevolent actions that serve others. Meanwhile, ill will arouses antipathy. Ethical theory 
extrapolates from this and gives its seal of rational approval to the implicit standard in such judgments: 
“the Good must be defined in terms of impulses that further general welfare since they are the ones 
naturally approved” (Dewey, undated ms, 10). This is the natural and non-arbitrary standard we arrive at 
when, in Smith’s idiom, we take up the standpoint of a fully informed impartial spectator. In this way, 
moral sentiment theorists accounted for aspiration (for the good) and compliance (with duty) in terms of 
what they took to be the more fundamental fact of approval and disapproval (the virtuous and vicious). 
Mid-nineteenth-century British utilitarianism inherited this legacy, as is especially evident in Mill’s focus 
on social sympathy. But in Dewey’s view Mill illogically tried to combine “Dr. Jekyll” with “Mr. Hyde”: 
(a) the pursuit of general welfare as the legitimate natural standard implicit in social approval (or 
reproach) of dispositions and practices with (b) the hedonistic idea that individual pleasure is the summum 
bonum. 
To summarize, for monistic theories rooted in the third factor, a practice or disposition such as 
generosity, courage, honesty, industriousness, or compassion is deemed good and dutiful because our 
moral sentiments naturally approve it (and ought legitimately to approve it when considered from an 
impartial perspective) as virtuous; a predisposition such as miserliness or retaliatory payback is bad and 
wrong because it is vicious (and rationally merits disapproval). To the degree that virtue theorists are 
monists—and Hume was a pluralist of sorts, at least with respect to fundamental conflicts among moral 
ends (see Gill 2011)—they infer that concepts such as goodness, welfare, duty, and right can be 
systematically organized without remainder under a conception of virtuous character traits, taking these 
traits to be those we should approve because they are contributory to a rationally defensible conception of 
living and being well. Monistic virtue theorists hold that cultivating stable behavioral traits that are as 
virtuous as possible is what it ultimately means to be moral. Or, to update Dewey’s analysis, the virtue 
theorist must at least fictionalize (see Alfano 2013) stable character traits. Situational psychologists and 
ethical theorists are currently debating whether we are capable of exhibiting these traits in the trans-
contextual way that is required by strong monistic virtue theories (see Appiah 2008, ch. 2). 
Conclusion 
In the spirit of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental 
Method into Moral Subjects, Dewey sought to bring experimental method to bear on value inquiry. “The 
growth of the experimental as distinct from the dogmatic habit of mind,” he asserted, “is due to increased 
ability to utilize variations for constructive ends instead of suppressing them” (LW 1, 7). Accordingly, he 
saw variability in valuing and valuations as a useful entry point for further inquiry, rather than as a 
troublesome deviation to be flattened. 
Dewey recommended abandoning the old quest for a completely enlightened ideal standpoint 
secured prior to struggling with difficulties in particular contexts, a standpoint from which our general 
way of thinking about morals will be fully adequate to meeting every situation with what is best in us. 
Our actual experiments in living assuredly involve ideals and idealizations—often one-sided--through 
which we appraise alternative avenues for acting, as Appiah has argued (2017). But they have always 
proceeded without access to a non-contingent ideal standpoint. What ethical theory can do, despite (and at 
times likely because of) its one-sided idealizations, is to help lay bare “the factors causing [problems] and 
thus make the choice more intelligent” (in Koch 2010, 2.2241–2.2245). 
Dewey understood that ad hoc rationalizations can masquerade as intelligent deliberation. In  
Haidt’s recent phrasing, so-called “moral reasoning” often amounts to little more than a self-justifying, 
ineffectual “rider” atop the headstrong “elephant” of habituated intuitions (Haidt 2012). This is from 
Dewey’s angle an everyday deliberative vice. But at the other extreme, we may be like Hamlet in his 
indecision, “sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought” (Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, scene ii) so that we 
shirk responsibility for choosing. Excessive deliberation amounts to dawdling, or signifies a manically 
imbalanced character (LW 7, 170). Dewey observed a related tendency to slough off responsibility among 
intellectuals who retreat to remote abstractions even when immediate conditions require more than 
begrudging notice. Those who “devote themselves to thinking are likely to be unusually unthinking in 
some respects, as for example in immediate personal relationships” (MW 14, 137). Mike Parker 
humorously wrote in Map Addict: “I’m the one in the car with the map in his lap, …often at the expense 
of seeing the actual landscape it depicts rolling past on the other side of the window” (2010, 2). Like 
Parker, moral and political philosophers tend to be more map-oriented than terrain-oriented. There are 
consolations of retreating from the ambient buzz, but at our philosophic best we do not escape from 
existential peril into symbolic formulations and indulgently remain there. 
But how do we work out which choices are progressive or regressive? Dewey offers no pat 
answer to this question. Instead of offering yet another iteration of the old escape through faith or reason 
to an antecedently established “aperspectival position” (Johnson 2014, 120), Dewey embraced the fact 
that when we ask different questions, we see different connections and possibilities. As is often observed, 
to ask the Kantian question (What is my duty?) or the utilitarian question (Which actions help us do the 
most good we can do?) is not to ask the Aristotelian question (Which character traits contribute to the 
eudaemon life?). To appropriate Heisenberg, what we observe is not the moral situation in itself, but the 
situation exposed to our method of questioning (see 1958, 32). 
As Dewey framed his pluralistic ethical theory, his central questions were as follows: when we 
are morally conflicted, is this a superficial hesitancy that would dissipate if only we could conduct our 
reasoning rightly, marshal enough data, consult our inborn moral sense, or pray harder? Or, is the 
experience of moral conflict often rooted in something intractable, a conflict intrinsic to the situation 
itself? Should we strive for a one-size-fits-all approach that organizes moral cognition under a single 
covering concept? Do the traditional blanket concepts of good, right, and virtue arise from the same 
empirical source in our moral experience, or do they express distinctive roots? If leading moral categories 
express independent forces with different empirical roots, are these roots ultimately fully compatible? Or 
do they pull us in different directions, leaving us in a muddle about what to choose? If there are practical 
incommensurabilities between primitive springs of moral action, then how can we practically manage and 
evaluate the normative claims made on us by these disparate forces? 
Dewey’s typically-for-him-programmatic stab at answering these questions pivoted on the thesis 
that there are “independent variables in moral action” (LW 5, 280), these diverse experiential factors are 
in tension with each other, and they are reducible neither to an ideal starting point for moral inquiry nor to 
a changeless universal foundation. The three primitive strands that Dewey analyzed are conceptually 
distinct and have independent sources, but in actual moral experiences they intertwine and “cut across one 
another.” For moral deliberation to be at all comprehensive, it must search for a way to reconcile 
conflicting variables to each other by weaving them into a tapestry of action that more-or-less 
satisfactorily expresses the tensions that originally set the problem at hand (Fesmire 2003, ch. 7). 
Dewey developed a hypothesis to clarify how often-conflicting basic values relate to one another 
and how they might be put into communication with each other without being hypostatized. He thereby 
showed how functionally isolated theories can be critically appraised within a wider normative context 
even as these theories retain distinctive emphases as idealized partial mappings of the terrain of moral 
action. Maps are tools, so when these partial mappings of normative ideals are clung to as though they are 
true “independent of what they lead to when used as directive principles” (LW 4, 221), dogmatism is 
fueled and deliberation remains incomplete. But when normative models are reframed as revisable 
experiments in living (cf. Mill 1986), as what Dewey in The Quest for Certainty called instrumentalities 
of direction, then they can be progressively reformed through our interactions. 
Dewey concluded “Three Independent Factors in Morals” with a call for our moral imaginations 
to become more perceptive and responsive to concrete situations. His insights from the early 1930s can be 
supplemented with contemporary research on DuBoisian “double consciousness,” or better, Jose 
Medina’s “kaleidoscopic consciousness” standing democratically in the intersections of race, class, 
gender, ethnicity, sexuality, religion, nationality, and culture. Insofar as moral problems are 
entanglements, then “zeal for a unitary view” oversimplifies moral life (LW 5, 288). Striving for 
systematic coherence can be a philosophic virtue, and abstracting some factor of moral action as central 
and uppermost has great instrumental value. But when we hypostatize it, then treat this factor as the self-
sufficient starting point for moral inquiry and the bedrock for all moral justification, we perpetuate the 
same problems as when we indulge in the popular habit of singling out one trump value or concern among 
a wide range of relevant values.10 
In summary, Dewey hypothesized that good, duty, and virtue are distinct moral categories that 
express different experiential origins, and none fully includes all that is morally relevant in the rest. 
Hence, moral life does not have a single central and basic source of justification. Instead of beginning 
moral reflection with a single abstracted factor, Dewey proposes that we should begin our reflective 
excursions with a practical predicament in lieu of a theoretical starting point (Pappas 2008, 2019). In this 
way, we discover that diverse factors are already in tension with each other. Our foremost practical need 
is for fine-tuned habits that enable us to comprehensively coordinate and integrate these tensions. 
Theories and practices that open communication between conflicting factors can better inform our moral 
deliberations. Dewey consequently sought in his work in ethical theory from 1926 to 1932 to analyze the 
main categories through which ethical theories have concentrated attention on these factors, in order to 
put them in communication for the sake of more responsible choices. 
Dewey doubtless hoped to inspire theoretical projects reconciling these diverse factors. Such 
projects could change the terms of debate within and across ethical traditions. Dewey approached 
historical ethical and sociopolitical theories as resources for social inquiry, not as finalities to be accepted 
or rejected wholesale (LW 7, 179; cf. Koch 2010). He thought that rejecting such zero-sum theorizing 
could open a door for research into classic moral philosophies as compensatory emphases, in dynamic 
tension with other selective emphases.11 These monistic philosophies were forged in part as idealized 
tools to make sense of and navigate social situations. In “Three Independent Factors in Morals,” Dewey 
reveals how their durable practical value can be liberated through philosophical research that at last gets 
over both the quest for, and the tone of, finality and instead rededicates itself to experimentally 
developing robust communicative projects with distinctive emphases, angles, and inferences.12 
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